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The	managerial	grip	-	Brief	historicizing	reflection	on	the	role	of	technology	in	organising	for	creativity		Daniel	Hjorth,	Copenhagen	Business	School,	Denmark,	dh.mpp@cbs.dk	and	Nottingham	Business	School,	Nottingham	Trent	University,	UK	 	“…as	long	as	we	limit	ourselves	to	viewing	technology	from	the	perspective	of	instrumentality,	we	will	not	understand	its	true	nature	and	will	remain	held	in	the	illusion	of	mastering	it.	Only	if	we	instead	understand	the	instrumental	as	a	mode	of	causality	will	technology	then	be	revealed	for	what	it	is,	which	is	to	say	as	a	destining	of	revealing.”	(Heidegger’s	The	Question	Concerning	Technology,	1977:	337)		
Opening:	Technology	and	management	The	unrivalled	‘author’	of	the	most	effectively	applied	behaviourism	in	contexts	of	organisation,	since	late	modernism,	must	be	managerialism	as	governmental	rationality.	Chris	Grey	(1996)	offers	a	broad	description	of	managerialism	as	the	idea	that	there	are	no	limits	to	what	is	manageable	and	that	everything	should	be	managed.	Ingersoll	and	Adams’	study	of	the	managerial	metamyth,	is	summarised	in	Stanley	Deetz’s	critique	of	‘corporate	colonisation’	(1992:	223)	as	saying:	1)	that	“…all	work	processes	can	and	should	be	rationalized,	that	is,	broken	into	their	constitutive	parts	and	so	thoroughly	understood	that	they	can	be	completely	controlled,	2)	the	means	for	attaining	organizational	objectives	deserves	maximum	attention,	with	the	result	that	the	objectives	quickly	be	subordinated	to	the	means,	even	to	the	extent	that	the	objectives	become	lost	or	forgotten,	and	3)	efficiency	and	predictability	are	more	important	than	any	other	consideration.”	(Ingersoll	and	Adams,	1986:	366).		Already	here	we	find	what	later	in	this	paper	will	be	describe	as	a	digital	
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approach	to	the	management	of	everyday	organisational	life.	This	approach	is	based	on	the	idea	that	work	can	and	should	be	broken	down	into	constitutive	parts,	and	that	those	parts	are	compatible	and	adjustable	in	the	systemic	whole	that	calls	for	tight	management.	The	assumption,	thus,	includes	the	idea	that	those	parts	are	to	be	found	or	else	are	missing.	Bits	are	to	be	managed,	recorded	and	stored	as	bytes,	calculated	through	algorithms,	controlled	via	the	laws	of	mathematics.	Managing	is	controlling	the	execution	of	such	‘software’.	Present-day	softwarisation	and	algorithmisation	of	organisations	further	strengthens	this	‘digitalist’	approach	by	assuming	that	the	coding	of	information	into	software	that	executes	the	thus	programmed	in	exact	and	predictable	ways	is	extendable	into	the	actual	decision	making	and	management	of	work.	The	sales	argument	of	‘Business	Intelligence	&	Analytics’	software	is	often	that	it	brings	‘powerful	insight	to	your	fingertips.’	The	assumption	is	that	by	some	isomorphic	imagination	you	are	invited	to	think	that	running	the	business	will	be	like	running	your	software,	and,	having	the	correctly	processed	data	means	insight	is	the	output.	Insight	that,	according	to	Oxford	Dictionary,	means	an	accurate	and	deep	understanding.	In	today’s	innovation-focused	organisation	such	understanding	needs	to	be	focused	on	the	organisational	conditions	for	creativity.	Can	the	digital	age	in	information	processing	increase	our	capacity	to	enhance	those	conditions?	As	if	a	science	operating	under	mathematical	laws	is	involved	in	the	same	way	both	inside	and	outside	of	the	computer.	As	if	algorithms	are	applicable	in	both	environments.	With	the	genealogist’s	curiosity	we	ask:	Where	did	that	assumption	come	from?	F.W.	Taylor	do	state	in	his	1911	paper	–	Principles	of	Scientific	
Management	–	that	the	paper’s	third	aim	is:	“To	prove	that	the	best	management	is	a	true	science,	resting	upon	clearly	defined	laws,	rules,	and	principles,	as	a	foundation.	And	further	to	show	that	the	fundamental	principles	of	scientific	management	are	applicable	to	all	kinds	of	human	activities,	from	our	simplest	individual	acts	to	the	work	of	our	great	corporations…”	(p.	2).	As	a	consequence,	he	also	notes:	“It	is	true	that	with	scientific	management	the	workman	is	not	allowed	to	use	whatever	implements	and	methods	he	sees	fit	in	the	daily	practice	of	his	work.	(Ibid.,	p.	62)	I	believe	that	what	we	read	here	is	an	early	entry	of	a	digital	approach	to	management.	The	analogue	–	making	judgments	on	the	basis	
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of	tacit	knowledge,	or	the	‘see	fit’	that	indicate	an	aesthetic	consideration	-	starts	to	disappear	from	the	management	of	work	with	the	introduction	of	scientific	management.	The	digital	perspective	on	organisations	–	one	and	zero	as	only	options	-	has	thus	only	been	strengthened	with	the	gradual	introduction	of	software	aided	management	systems	(look	at	the	growth	of	companies	such	as	SAP).	But	more	importantly,	Taylor	made	management	itself	into	a	technology.	Management	is	grasped	by	the	supreme	goals	–	economic	efficiency	and	social	control	–	and	is	asked	to	grasp	the	organization	in	the	same	manner.	This,	however,	is	increasingly	done	via	the	aid	that	technology	provides.	Management	is	itself	changed	from	a	direct	handling	of	people	and	things,	into	the	handling	of	technology	that	handles	people	and	things.	It	becomes,	as	Foucault	pointed	out,	a	style	of	government	that	conducts	itself	so	as	to	conduct	the	conduct	of	others	(Foucault,	1991:	48).	In	this	article	I	am	thus	drawn	into	a	focus	on	management	as	a	technology	that	increasingly	uses	technology	(information	processing	such)	to	manage.	Whereas	Taylor	moved	control	from	the	direct	relationship	with	the	authoritative	manager	to	the	machine	and	transferred	authority	over	to	the	tempo	of	the	machine	(Donzelot,	1988),	we	find	in	Simon’s	(1945)	Administrative	
Behaviour	a	prophetic	praise	for	what	the	computer	will	be	able	to	do	for	decision	making	optimization	in	future	organisations	(p.	299).	Simon	establishes	an	affinity	between	decision	making	and	the	‘.exe’-file	of	the	computer	program.	Advanced	ICT-systems	are	increasingly	replacing	judgment	with	algorithms,	meaning	analysis	and	decision	is	more	and	more	automated.	More	precisely,	more	of	the	information	assumed	to	be	needed	for	making	a	decision	is	already	processed,	as	if	deciding	could	free	itself	from	that	directedness	invested	in	the	preparation.	SAP	(largest	business	software	company)	promises:	“Achieve	better	business	results	by	fully	empowering,	engaging,	and	developing	your	talent	–	with	human	capital	management	(HCM)	software	from	SAP	SuccessFactors.”	(www.go.sap.com,	accessed	May	9th,	2016).	Again,	Herbert	Simon	pointed	this	out	in	a	visionary	note:	“In	the	post-industrial	society,	the	central	problem	is	not	how	to	organize	to	produce	efficiently	[…]	but	how	to	organize	to	make	decisions	–	that	is,	to	process	information.”	(Simon,	1945:	292).	He	then	suggests	this	is	what	computers	and	information	systems	will	do	for	us.	It	reads	like	the	business	
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plan	for	SAP	when	it	was	founded	back	in	1972	(now	at	77.000	employees	and	€21	billion	in	revenue).	The	question	this	article	investigates	is	how	today’s	digitalization,	softwareization	and	algorithmization	of	the	organization	might	also	mean	that	the	playful	and	affective	is	squeezed	out.	If	so,	does	this	have	implications	for	creativity	and	entrepreneurship?	The	idea	is	that	the	analogue	(as	opposed	to	the	digital,	knowing	these	are	not	completely	separate)	might	hold	a	multiplicity,	in	its	vagueness,	which	calls	upon	imagination	in	order	to	make	sense.	It	takes	adaptive,	responsive	neurological	nets	to	generate	as	reply	something	that	is	not	pre-coded.	Imagination,	Massumi	(2002:	134)	writes,	“…is	the	mode	of	thought	most	precisely	suited	to	the	differentiating	vagueness	of	the	virtual.”	The	virtual	being	the	swarming	of	potentialities	for	what	the	world	might	become,	real	but	abstract,	and	necessarily	limited	to	a	specific	functional	context	when	actualized	(or	created).	Do	we	loose	the	analogue,	and	thus	the	source	of	imagination,	virtuality	and	creation,	when	our	organisations	are	digitalized?	Or	is	it	technology	as	such,	made	part	of	managing	through	Taylor,	that	represents	the	challenge?		Technology	is	then	understood	as	a	way	of	handling	the	openness	of	relationships,	the	relational	(moving);	a	handling	that	seeks	to	control	and	for	which	the	digital	(as	prophesized	by	Simon)	remains	an	attractive	promise	(of	closedness,	zero	noise,	predictability,	accuracy,	and	thus	efficiency).	The	question,	in	other	terms,	is	whether	the	price	of	digital	efficiency	and	minimization	of	noise	is	the	generative	vagueness	of	the	analogue?	The	latter	can	never	disappear,	since	it	is	always	in	excess	over	the	digital.	It	‘perceptually	fringes’	(Massumi,	2002:	143)	says,	and	he	adds;	‘the	analogue	is	always	a	fold	ahead’,	meaning	it	does	not	stop	at	the	‘digital	limit’	(there	can	only	be	1	or	0)	without	anticipating	what	moving	further	might	entail.	Imagination	will	always	imagine	what’s	behind	the	corner.	Affect	registers	such	vagueness	as	an	intensification	(fear,	excitement,	thrill);	an	anticipation	that	makes	change,	movement,	becoming,	and	newness	incipient.		
Historicising	the	managerial	grip	on	the	human	
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I	want	to	look	at	management	more	generally	as	a	(behavioural)	technology	that	uses	technology	to	relate	to	the	other	assuming	this	is	a	way	to	make	the	other’s	behaviour	follow	a	specific	path.	As	such	it	is	resonant	with	information	processing	technology	that	algorithmically	relates	information	to	certain,	predetermined	outcomes	(coded)	when	processed.	Technology	would	then	correspond	to	a	legitimate	expectation	–	amongst	decision	makers	in	particular	–	that	a	certain	input	should	yield	a	certain	output	if	processed	using	a	certain	technique:	the	‘mode	of	causality’	that	Heidegger	points	to	in	the	opening	quote.	It	is	specific	for	digital	technology	that	it	promises	no	distortion	(noise	immune)	in	transmission,	that	it	consumes	fewer	resources	when	storing	and	transmitting,	but	that	it	requires	more	bandwidth	to	transmit	the	same	information	compared	to	analogue	technology.	In	perspective	of	the	washing	out	of	noise	that	digitalization	represents,	I	suggest	that	we	inquire	into	whether	the	sources	of	the	new	spring	perhaps	primarily	from	the	noisy	part	of	the	organisation	(information-wise).	Would	the	clean	information	handling	of	digital	media	processing	lead	to	that	the	baby	is	thrown	out	with	the	bathwater	in	the	washing	away	of	the	analogue	dirt?	Roughly	speaking;	you	are	not	likely	to	invent	new	dialogues	with	the	ATM,	it	has	only	a	limited,	preprogramed/coded	set	of	algorithmically	enabled	responses.	But	maybe	the	Herakleitan	playing	child	that,	in	his	description,	rules	the	world,	can	still	bring	about	creative	becoming	vid	affectively	engaged	bodies	in	motion?	Maybe	the	multiplicity	and	open-endedness	of	play,	most	of	which	reads	like	mess	from	a	digital	perspective	on	what	makes	algorithms	tick,	finds	ways	through	the	tightly	coded	organisational	landscape?	But	what	is	there	before	F.	W.	Taylor	and	Herbert	Simon,	that	places	management	on	the	path	that	today	makes	softwareized	decision	making	into	normal	and	businesses	like	SAP	grow?	A	recent	article	from	The	Economist	(Sept.	12th,	2015),	referring	to	a	piece	on	Amazon	in	New	York	Times,	states:	“…digital	Taylorism	looks	set	to	be	a	more	powerful	force	than	its	analogue	predecessor.	The	prominent	technology	firms	that	set	the	tone	for	much	of	the	business	world	are	embracing	it.	[…]	Pentland’s	sociometric	badges	have	produced	some	counter-intuitive	results:	for	example,	in	a	study	of	80	employees	in	a	Bank	of	
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America	call	centre,	he	found	that	the	most	successful	teams	were	the	ones	that	spent	more	time	doing	what	their	managers	presumably	didn’t	want	them	to	do:	chatting	with	each	other.	Amazon’s	“Amabots”,	as	they	call	themselves,	seem	happy	to	put	up	with	micromanagement	if	they	get	a	nice	bonus	at	the	end	of	the	year.”	Where	does	this	passion	for	technology	as	a	route	to	evermore	control	come	from?		As	a	genealogical	gesture	that	seeks	to	reveal	how	the	intimacy	of	management	and	technology	was	inaugurated	(admittedly	a	too	bold	an	ambition),	we	can	turn	to	Hirschman’s	(1977)	splendid	and	still	very	timely	study	of	the	rise	of	arguments	for	capitalism	before	its	triumph	(as	the	subtitle	says)	–	the	study	of	the	Passions	and	the	Interests.	It	keeps	generating	a	context	in	which	its	relevance	becomes	apparent.	Perhaps	the	role	of	technology	is	most	precisely	communicated	in	the	analysis	of	the	image	from	the	Emblemata	Politica	(Nuremburg,	1617),	pivotal	to	Hirschman’s	study.	This	might	be	so	for	the	reason	that	technology	as	well	as	art	holds	a	revealing	power	that,	in	this	image,	are	strangely	intertwined.	Technology	and	art	are	here	made	to	touch	in	the	Greek	sense	of	technē	–	as	a	craft	of	making,	which	is	also	intimately	related	to	a	bringing	forth,	a	revealing	(poiesis).	These	two	sides	of	technē	are	curiously	captured	in	this	image	as	it	both	shows	that	‘the	coming	to	presence	of	technology	threatens	revealing,	threatens	it	with	the	possibility	that	all	revealing	will	be	consumed	in	ordering’	(Heidegger,	TQT,	p.	18),	and	it	does	so	in	a	poetic	way,	revealing	in	a	shining	or	radiant	un-concealing	(or	disclosing;	cf.	Spinosa,	Flores	and	Dreyfus,	1997).	However,	it	is	also	precisely	here	I	find	the	image	fascinating,	in	that	it	brings	technē	and	poiesis	together,	for	it	also	says	–	maybe	for	the	first	time	in	modern	history,	in	this	particular	way	–	that	we	ought	to	allow	technē	to	drive	out	other	possible	ways	of	revealing	by	enframing	(Heidegger’s	Gestell)	technology	as	precisely	assembling,	calling	forth	a	particular	order.	The	image	would	thus	show	us	the	battle	between	poiesis	and	
technē	that	technē	will	win.	There	is	thus,	performatively,	a	destining	in	this:	it	shows	us	what	technology	does,	at	the	cost	of	poiesis?	This	dichotomy	seem	like	a	retrospective	construct	(cf.	Eikhof	and	Haunschild,	2007),	added	as	a	result	of	a	romantic	understanding	of	art.	Rather,	at	the	time	(1617),	this	squeezing	out	of	
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the	heart-elements	seems	rather	as	a	necessary	cleaning	out	of	the	mess	that	belongs	to	the	affective,	bodily.	In	a	digital	language	we	would	call	this	noice-immunity.		
		The	Latin	text	below	the	image	in	the	original	printing	is	as	follows	(English	translation	included):	Latin	 English	
Affectus	Comprime	
	
Regina	Ratio	recta	Regibus	imperat,		
Et	dictat	adfectus	cohercere	improbos		
Pareto	rationi;	catenis,	vinculis		
Master/Repress/Retrain	the	affects/passions		Queen	Reason	rules	properly	over	her	subjects	and	decrees		that	disparate	affectus	be	made	to	
This is a draft paper. Please don’t quote without permission. 
	 8	
Cohibe	(pathos),	tibi	ut	secundae	res	
eant.	 agree	with	one	another.	Yield	to	reason;	bind	your	passions	together	with	chains	and	fetters	as	good	fortune	is	apt	to	swim	away	from	you.	(transl.	Leo,	2009:	391)			
The	image	and	the	text	following	(cited	above)	prove	to	be	rather	difficult	to	merge	into	one	coherent	understanding.	The	text	seems	to	address	human	capacity	to	control	affects	and	passions,	whereas	the	image	as	such	–	and	the	title	given	in	the	image	–	seems	to	refer	to	a	greater	economy	of	activity	and	passivity	over	which	only	Reason/Nature	reigns.	This	is	then	closer	to	Spinoza’s	idea	that	affect	is	much	more	what	produces	subjectivities	than	it	is	a	product	of	subjects.	Such	a	view	is	resonant	with	a	processual	understanding	of	subject-positions	as	relationally	composed,	always	in	open-ended	processes	of	becoming,	and	always	already	belonging	to	a	sociality	(Deleuze,	1988;	Massumi,	2002;	2015).	Individual	and	society	is	here	unthinkable	outside	a	relationship,	‘empirically	inseparable,	they	are	strictly	simultaneous	and	consubstantial’	(Massumi,	2002:	71).		
What	I	find	particularly	curious	in	‘Hirschman’s	image,’	however,	is	the	use	of	the	pincers.	As	a	representative	of	technology,	I	am	asking	why,	in	the	context	when	this	was	communicated,	would	God	need	a	piece	of	technology	to	achieve	his/her	end?	Indeed,	a	man-made	thing	like	a	pair	of	pincers	could	not	come	in-between	God	and	his/her	creation.	If	not	God,	why	is	the	arm	coming	out	of	a	cloud?	If,	thus,	the	hand	coming	out	of	the	cloud	is	Reason	(as	the	text	below	the	image,	in	the	original	printing,	suggests	in	Leo’s	(2009)	interpretation),	we	would	more	readily	accept	that	the	pincers	then	‘walks	the	talk’	by	applying	the	effect	of	reason	–	technological	development	–	to	make	the	statement	clearer.	In	addition	to	using	technology,	technology	would	also	help	you	keep	the	distance	to	the	heart,	i.e.,	to	hold	affectus	comprime,	repressed.	Reason	was	of	course	divine	and	the	church	had	a	historical	monopoly	representing	divine	reason	to	its	subjects.	The	image’s	message	is	also	that	technology	(a	materialisation	of	reason)	helps	us	achieve	control	over	affections.	Reason	would	guide	the	hand	to	exploit	the	
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forces	of	the	pincers.	The	heart	is	clearly	in	the	grip	of	the	pincers,	and	there	is	no	doubt	that	this	grip	is	potentially	devastating.	The	pincers	provide	a	lever	effect	that	multiplies	the	force	of	the	hand:	reason	is	strengthened	by	technology.	The	message:	technology	increases	your	force,	enables	you	to	dominate	other	forces,	brings	you	to	the	favourable	position	in	a	hierarchy	of	forces.	Leo	(2009)	suggests	both	messages	are	held	together	in	the	image	–	a	poetry	of	composition:	we	can	control	our	affectus/passion,	but	it	also	goes	beyond	what	we	can	decide/control/master:		“In	Spinoza’s	Ethica,	moreover,	affectus	are	not	reducible	to	feelings	or	emotions.	Affects,	rather,	exceed,	reconfigure	and	reorganize	bodies	and	subjects;	they	are	thus	constitutive	of,	and	integral	to,	a	dynamic	economy	of	activity	and	passivity.	In	the	Emblemata	Politica	a	similar	definition	of	affectus	is	revealed	in	the	tension	between	the	Latin	poetry	and	the	image—between	the	determination	of	affectus	as	a	passion	within	the	subject’s	control	and	its	status	in	a	larger	divine	economy,	the	province	of	God,	exceeding	the	limits	of	human	agency.”	(Leo,	2009:	393).			This	is	fully	consistent	with	Spinoza’s	view	of	affect,	passion	and	action,	and	how	it	is	interpreted	by	Gilles	Deleuze,	who	renews	the	way	we	understand	Spinoza	(Deleuze,	1988;	Spindler,	2010).	An	affect,	in	Spinoza’s	Ethics,	is	described	as	a	duration	that	makes	a	body/mind	tend	towards	the	next	state	in	a	way	that	either	increases	its	power	of	acting	or	decreases	its	power	of	acting	(Deleuze,	1988:	48-49).	Affect	describes	a	body/mind’s	potential	for	interaction.	And	therefore,	as	noted	above,	the	analogue	(body	and	thought,	they	are	parallel	to	Spinoza)	is	a	‘fold	ahead’,	since	it	tends/leaps,	moved	by	affect,	beyond	the	present	limit:	it	brings	interactive	capacity	also	to	the	imagined-to-come.		Principally,	for	Spinoza,	only	God	can	act	in	the	full	sense	of	being	capable	of	adequate	ideas	that	can	guide	the	body/mind	to	act.	The	rest	of	us	are	passionate	beings	that	become-new	all	the	time	by	forming	inadequate	ideas,	that	makes	us	open	to	external	ideas	that	can	act	upon	us	to	some	extent	and	make	us	move	to	a	greater	or	lesser	force	of	existing/power	to	act,	than	before	–	
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greater	or	lesser	conatus	in	Spinoza’s	terms.	“Accordingly,	it	will	be	said	that	its	power	of	acting	or	force	of	existing	increases	or	diminishes,	since	the	power	of	the	other	mode	is	added	to	it,	or	on	the	contrary	is	withdrawn	from	it…[…]	The	passage	to	a	greater	perfection,	or	the	increase	of	the	power	of	acting,	is	called	an	affect	[…]	of	joy;	the	passage	to	a	lesser	perfection	or	the	diminution	of	the	power	of	acting	is	called	sadness.	(Deleuze,	1988:	50).	The	question	is	what	role	technology	has	as	a	way	to	joy	or	sadness	in	our	organisational	lives.	It	is	not	a	wild	speculation	to	suggest	that	in	the	hands	of	managers,	on	the	upper	side	of	a	hierarchy	of	forces,	technology	(information	technology	in	focus	here)	would	increases	one’s	power	of	acting	(joy),	increase	the	technology-user’s	efficiency,	whereas	on	the	dominated	side	of	the	hierarchy,	one’s	controllability	would	be	increased	and	thus	potentially	one’s	sadness.	The	analogue	noise,	however,	operates	at	the	fringe,	and	imagines	a	rest	from	being	affected	by	the	virtual.		
On	the	analogue	-	digital	distinction	and	management	Since	the	digitalization	of	information	and	communication,	management	has	also	shown	to	be	marvellous	in	its	capacity	to	integrate	technology	in	ever	more	intricate	ways	into	methods	of	control.	Technology	has	always	been	a	key	element	in	managing,	as	one	way	to	describe	managing	is	to	say	it	secures	the	on-going	reproduction	of	predictability	and	efficiency	in	organisation	(Chandler,	1977).	If	we	by	technology	understand	a	specifically	configured	system	of	knowledge,	prescribing	a	limited	range	of	practices,	managing	would	then	operate	with	knowledge-practice	relationships	that	mean	we	should	legitimately	expect	control	over	correct	execution	to	be	possible.	And	it	does	that	by	increasingly	relying	on	information-technology	that	algorithmically	secures	predictability,	efficiency	and	controllability	in	organisations.	Management	in	itself	is	thus	a	general	form	of	technology	in	human	organisation,	and	digitalization	has	meant	that	computer-based	information	processing	technology	further	drives	standardization	(Kallinikos,	2001).	This	means	that	information	increasingly	needs	to	be	uniform	(bits):	easily	recognised,	assessed	and	accumulated/stored	(as	bytes)	by	the	algorithmically	operating	systems.	Such	‘machines’	are	also	abstract	in	the	sense	that	they	are	not	developed	in	site,	to	fit	
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local	conditions	–	as	is	the	case	with	bureaucratic	procedures	–	but	rather	coded	for	context-independent,	universal	use.	“…[C]ompared	to	the	strictly	standardized	and	codified	character	of	computer-based	applications,	bureaucratic	rules	were	vague	and	open	enough	to	be	shaped	by	the	specific	circumstances	of	particular	organizations.”	(Kallinikos,	2001:	58).	Such	openness	allowed	for	tactical	interventions,	insinuations	that	explored	and	experimented	in	the	cracks	of	the	strategic	grid	of	the	bureaucratic	system,	so	as	to	transform	and	change	the	whole.	An	analogue	technology	would	thus	also	allow	for	creativity,	which	seems	to	be	‘coded’	out	of	the	information	processing	systems	in	the	digital	era	of	un-human	precision.	The	less	precise	does	call	upon	judgement,	whereas	the	(digitally)	precise	only	needs	a	decision	to	execute	prolonging	of	what	the	data	tells	you	(i.e.,	the	incipient	causality).	There	is,	according	to	the	digital	information	logic,	only	right	or	wrong,	correct	or	incorrect,	efficient	or	inefficient	ways	of	doing.	One	and	zero,	no	in-betweens.	Isn’t	creativity	analogue	in	this	sense?	Or,	rather,	isn’t	creativity’s	opportunities	infinite	in	the	analogue	representation	of	the	world?	The	analogue	is	processually	continuous	with	an	infinite	number	of	potential	in-betweens	and	a	movement	that	at	all	times	is	saturated	by	potentiality,	or	tendency	to	become.	The	digital	is	like	a	Lego	approximation	of	life,	in	bits	and	straight	lines	without	tendencies:	every	piece	goes	on	according	to	a	certain,	preprogramed	quantity,	and	when	it	stops	it	stops	in	full	(and	the	next	starts):	
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	There	are	many	excellent	inquiries	into	management	as	a	technology	(for	a	recent	example,	see	Bloom,	Sadun,	and	Van	Reenen,	2015),	where	management	is	defined	(for	survey-based	measurement	purposes)	as	monitoring,	target-setting,	and	incentives/people	management.	Such	definitions	can	themselves	be	thought	of	as	a	digitalisation	of	the	managerial	practice	and	function.	The	translation	of	management	practice	into	a	conceptual	definition	is	meant	to	serve	an	operational	definition	that	lends	itself	to	quantification	and	statistical	processing.	It	becomes	–	in	an	analogy	to	the	image	above	–	a	digital	representation	of	the	analogue	practice.	In	contrast,	qualitative	methods	can	be	said	to	represent	a	strive	to	stay	with	language	(metaphors,	images)	so	as	to	keep	life	in	language.	Anthropologists	have	called	this	an	emic	view	(coined	by	the	linguist	Pike	in	1954;	locals’,	native’s	view)	and	the	ideal	scholarly	translation	of	such	into	text	as	‘thick	description’	(Geertz,	1974).	It	is	important	to	note,	as	Greenblatt	(1997)	does	(reading	Geertz)	that	thickness	is	a	result	of	description	and,	thus,	that	language	matters	(digital	or	analogue,	statistical	or	literary)	in	grasping	life.	We	can	serve	executing	decision-makers	with	data,	but	we	can	also	serve	imagination	by	including	tendencies,	affect	and	stuff	that	help	us	leap	ahead.	In	process	studies	that	also	strive	to	understand	how	the	organisational	conditions	for	creativity	is	changing	in	a	digitalized	world,	it	seems	wise	to	strive	
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for	an	analogue	resonance	with	lived	practice	that	we	study.	The	experience-near	point	of	view	that	is	dear	to	Geertzian	anthropological	ethnographers	comes,	however,	with	the	challenge	of	bringing	this	point	of	view	into	language.	Greenblatt	has	tackled	this	challenge,	leaning	on	Geertz.	When	Geertz	describes	the	interpretive	strategies	that	anthropologists	use	as	they	try	to	understand	the	symbolic	systems	and	life	patterns	they	study,	Greenblatt	says	this	resonates	with	a	literary	theorist	like	him.	This	is	because	language	–	also	literature	–	here	makes	contact	with	reality,	with	pieces	of	writing	or,	as	Greenblatt	clarifies,	with	‘verbal	traces	less	self-consciously	detached	from	the	lives	real	men	and	women	actually	live.’	(Greenblatt,	1997:	14).	Thickness,	again,	a	concept	Geertz	developed	from	Gilbert	Ryle’s	1968	lecture	on	thinking,	is	for	Ryle	“…not	in	the	object;	it	is	in	the	narrative	surroundings,	the	add-ons,	the	nested	frames.”	(Greenblatt,	1997:	17).		A	key	to	the	force	with	which	Geertz’	text	has	impacted	on	the	field	of	ethnography,	and	why	it	is	interesting	for	this	article,	lies	in	how	it	has	made	“…the	literary	and	the	nonliterary	seem	to	be	each	other's	thick	description.	That	both	the	literary	work	and	the	anthropological	(or	historical)	anecdote	are	texts,	that	both	are	fictions	in	the	sense	of	things	made,	that	both	are	shaped	by	the	imagination	and	by	the	available	resources	of	narration…”	(Greenblatt,	1997:	22)	is	the	reason	to	why	they	are	not	separated	by	some	non-traversable	canyon	dividing	the	real	from	the	fictitious.	At	the	bottom	of	the	canyon	runs	language	like	a	life-giving	flow	that	we	cannot	step	into	twice	but	which	has	made	the	rift	which	we	cross.	And	we	cross	using	the	only	method	that	performatively	affirms	the	life-bringing	capacity	of	language:	by	taking	the	plunge,	by	speaking	and	writing	with	the	force	of	poiesis.	This	seems	to	me	as	the	important	difference	–	is	taking	the	plunge	part	of	how	you	see	yourself	as	researcher,	or	not?	Performative	approaches	have	urged	us	to	‘jump	in’	(Beyes	and	Steyaert,	2011;	to	experiment,	Steyaert,	2012).	The	balance	thereby	has	to	shift	to	“…techniques	which	embrace	their	own	inventiveness	and	are	not	afraid	to	own	up	to	the	fact	that	they	add	(if	so	meagerly)	to	reality.”	(Massumi,	2002:	13).	We	arrive	at	imagination	and	the	poetic	as	ways	of	making	the	world	and	add	what	is	missing.	This	builds	on	the	analogue	as	a	productive	vagueness,	a	‘fold	ahead’	of	the	digital	noiseless	representation	of	the	world	that	fits	operations	management	
This is a draft paper. Please don’t quote without permission. 
	 14	
software	and	its	users.		
Technology,	Economy,	Organisation	and	Management	If	the	technique	is	‘looking	into	the	eye	of	the	one	that	address	you’,	the	technology	that	helps	us	understand	that	technique	would	(in	certain	cultural-historical	contexts)	be	that	of	politeness	or	courtesy.	If	a	certain	technique	or	behaviour	‘follows’	upon	another,	we	would	then	say	this	is	the	result	of	desiring	to	adapt	to	circumstances	so	that	one’s	actions	result	in	greater	fit	(less	friction,	minimal	transaction	costs)	or	efficiency.	This	is	an	approximate	definition	of	
homo	oeconomicus,	which,	in	Foucault’s	interpretation	of	Becker’s	neo-liberal	economics,	is	“…someone	who	accepts	reality.	Rational	conduct	is	any	conduct	which	is	sensitive	to	modifications	in	the	variables	of	the	environment	and	which	responds	to	this	in	an	non-random	way,	in	a	systematic	way,	and	economics	can	therefore	be	defined	as	the	science	of	the	systematic	nature	of	responses	to	environmental	variables.”	(Foucault,	2008:	269).	This	is	also	what	is	communicated	in	the	‘affectus	comprime’	image	above	–	it	is	a	calling,	a	summoning	and	destining	of	homo	oeconomicus.	Efficiency	would	then	be	limited	to	matching	expectations	in	a	way	that	reduces	loss	of	meaning	and	adjustment/correction	due	to	misunderstanding.	The	more	exact	‘transmission’	of	input	into	exact/predictable	output,	the	more	digital	a	technology	would	be	(given	the	digital	is	defined	by	its	immunity	to	distortion	and	noise).	Management	of	work	would	then	–	as	a	science	(cf.	Taylor	above)	–	benefit	from	a	digitalised	organisation	that	would	offer	a	non-random	way,	a	systemic	way	of	operating.	It	is	easy	to	see	how	more	software	support	is	demanded	or	even	craved	by	managers.	Seeing	management	as	a	technology	is	thus	based	on	a	contrast	between	human	action	that	trusts	the	open-endedness	of	processual	fluidity	and	behaviour	that	is	governed	or	directed	by	a	pre-configured	system	of	mechanisms	(input)	according	to	which	one	should	legitimately	expect	only	a	specific	set	of	decisions	and	behaviours	(techniques)	to	generate	a	specific	output.	Its	language	or	data	if	you	like.	
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Already	Herbert	Simon	was	aware	of	the	critique	against	‘mechanical	efficiency’	being	the	result	of	emphasising	administration/organisation/decision	making	as	a	technology.	What	is	new	in	this	then?	Today	the	creative,	entrepreneurial,	innovative	organisation	is	normal,	and	thus	we	want	to	understand	how	recent	algorithmization	impacts	on	(enables	or	prevents)	the	making	and	creating	activities	so	much	sought	after.	It	is	not	only	the	case	that	management	provided	the	most	successful	methods	for	making	the	marriage	between	economism	and	behaviourism	work	(Taylor,	1911;	Mayo,	1923;	1930;	1933;	O’Connor,	1999).	As	knowledge	and	practice,	it	has	also	proven	to	be	splendid	in	its	capacity	to	integrate	technology	into	work-processes	so	as	to	increase	their	efficiency.	Maybe	Simon’s	administrative	man	did	not	reach	further	with	the	help	of	technology,	but	technology	subsequently	reached	further	into	human	thinking	(as	Heidegger	implies	in	the	opening	quote),	judgement,	and	decision	making	so	as	to	make	it	more	resonant	with	information	processing	technology	in	algorithmic,	digitalized	form.	Jacques	Ellul,	the	author	of	the	central	study	of	technology	–	The	
Technological	Society	–	from	1954,	go	so	far	as	to	state	that	“…efficiency	is	the	very	law	of	technique.’	[…]	At	the	same	time	that	the	economist	has	created	a	technique	for	knowing,	he	(sic!)	has	created	a	technique	for	acting.”	(1954:	171).	He	adds:	“Like	a	horse	chafing	at	the	bit,	the	techniques	of	economic	science	await	the	signal	to	intervene	more	completely	than	ever	before	in	the	reality	they	have	come	to	understand.”	(Ibid.).	This	is	resonant	with	Foucault’s	more	general	remark	that	in	the	eighteenth	century	economy	came	to	“…designate	a	level	of	reality,	a	field	of	intervention…”	(1991:	93).	The	image	above,	when	the	pincers	squeeze	the	hart,	can	also	be	read	as	a	prophecy	of	this	‘level	of	reality’	that,	at	the	time,	was	about	to	become	dominant	(Foucault	suggested	it	did	so	in	the	18th	century;	the	hart-suqeezing	image	is	from	1617).	The	generality	of	this	‘level	of	reality’	made	Adam	Smith	imagine	economy	as	an	invisible	hand.	Although	he	had	carefully	prepared	his	study	of	economy	by	first	studying	moral	sentiments	(1759,	17	years	before	the	Wealth	of	Nations),	the	world	has	now	become	so	caught	up	in	the	economic	that	it	only	remembers	‘the	invisible	hand’	from	Smith’s	thinking.	Self-love	was	discussed	by	Smith	as	a	way	to	explain	the	
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motivation	underlying	exchange,	and	only	that,	and	“in	the	rest	of	Smith’s	writings,	there	are	extensive	discussion	of	the	role	of	other	motivations	that	influence	human	action	and	behaviour.”	writes	Amartya	Sen	(2010).		In	this	world,	becoming	increasingly	incapable	of	understanding	the	nature	and	motivation	of	human	action	outside	the	models	served	by	fashionable	economics,	the	dawn	of	the	Business	School	and	its	central	discipline	–	management	–	quickly	became	a	natural	extension	of	this	‘level	of	reality’.	Management	promised	to	marry	behaviourism	(psychology	had	advanced	along	instrumental	lines	too	in-between	the	two	world	wars)	and	economism	in	ways	that	promised	control	of	the	organisations.	Especially	in	its	North	American	version,	management	became	the	new	explanation	to	why	competitiveness	was	achieved.	Alfred	Chandler	(1977)	made	a	thin	but	well-spun	thread	back	to	Adam	Smith	when	he	adopted	the	‘invisible	hand’	metaphor	of	Smith’s	to	describe	management	as	the	‘visible	hand.’		The	role	of	the	manager	–	from	Italian	maneggiare,	meaning	‘to	handle-’	or	especially	‘to	control	a	horse’	–	is	here	implied	as	the	‘visible	hand’	that	functions	as	a	lever	and	adjustment	on	the	market	forces	(Chandler,	1977).	Economy	no	longer	refers	to	the	Greek	oikos	(oikonomia,	translated	as	dispositio	in	Latin,	i.e.,	dispositif	in	French,	translated	as	apparatus	in	English),	the	proper	management	of	the	household,	rather	it	emerges	as	a	new	ontology	where	the	population	as	a	whole	is	to	be	controlled	(Tellmann,	2009)	by	the	help	of	statistics.	It	seems	to	me	that	the	1617	image	above	is	part	of	this	campaign,	the	launching	of	a	new	governmental	regime,	where	economic	behaviour	generally	is	to	be	considered	constitutive	of	modern	humans	–	homo	oeconomicus	takes	centre	stage.	People	are	now	called	upon	in	this	specific	sense	that	they	are	supposed	to	become	governable	precisely	by	understanding	reality	as	economy	and	act	rationally	accordingly.	Otherwise,	‘fortune	will	swim	away	from	you’	(Poem	above).	What	role	has	technology	in	this?	Technology	rests	on	the	law	of	efficiency,	Ellul	(1954)	suggested.	Government	of	the	whole	population	co-emerges,	thus,	with	the	development	of	statistical	calculation	as	an	efficient	
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technique	and	technology.	But	there	is	a	clash	or	tension	between	the	free	movement,	the	playful	act	and	the	rational	act	in	the	specifically	economic	sense	–	a	clash	between	homo	ludens	and	homo	oeconomicus	if	you	like.	It	glimpses	through	in	Spinoza.	Trained	as	a	lens-maker,	as	a	polisher	of	lenses,	he	writes,	in	a	private	letter	to	the	Royal	Society	(London)	secretary	Henry	Oldenburg,	and	comments	on	a	another	lens-maker’s	(Christiaan	Huygen’s)	technological	development	with	the	following	note:	“The	said	Huygens	has	been	a	totally	occupied	man,	and	so	he	is,	with	polishing	glass	dioptrics;	to	that	end	a	workshop	he	has	outfitted,	and	in	it	he	is	able	to	“turn”	pans	–	as	is	said,	it’s	certainly	polished	–	what	tho’	thusly	he	will	have	accomplished	I	don’t	know,	nor,	to	admit	a	truth,	strongly	do	I	desire	to	know.	For	me,	as	is	said,	experience	has	taught	that	with	spherical	pans,	being	polished	by	a	free	hand	is	safer	and	better	than	any	machine.”		There	is	a	tension	between	wisdom,	built	from	the	free,	analogue	hand,	guided	by	experience,	and	the	insensate	hand,	following	the	digital	template	prescribed	by	technology.	Is	the	manus,	the	hand	of	management,	this	Ratio	that	is	guided	by	the	template	coded	into	technology,	serving	predictability	and	efficiency	today	–	more	than	ever	–	what	prevents	the	freedom	needed	for	creativity	to	happen	in	organisations?	Jacques	Ellul,	again,	writes:	“However	important	and	impressive	mechanical	technique	remains,	it	is	only	accessory	to	other	factors	which	are	much	more	decisive,	if	less	spectacular.	I	have	in	mind	the	vast	amount	of	organization	in	every	field,	the	recognition	of	which	led	James	Burnham	to	write	The	Managerial	Revolution.”	(p.	11).	In	‘The	Managerial	Revolution’,	originally	published	in	19411	Burnham	notes	that	the	managerialisation	of	society	is	characterized	by	locus	of	sovereignty	shifting	from	the	parliament	to	the	managerial	class.		What	he	says,	in	effect,	is	that	management	quickly	became	the	dominant	force,	normality,	theory,	and	ideology	for	organizing	modern	organisations	(business	or	non-business).	“What	is	occurring	in	this	transition	is	a	drive	for	social	domination,	for	power	and	privilege,	for	the	position	of	ruling	class,	by	the	social	group	or	class	of	the	managers…”	(Burnham:	1941:	71).	Studies	regarding	the	US	show	that	both	income	gap	(between	managers	and																																																									1	Note	this	is	36	years	before	Chandler	writes	‘The	visible	hand	–	the	managerial	revolution	in	American	business,’	and	8	years	before	George	Orwell’s	‘1984.’	
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workers)	increases	and	that	distribution	of	income	gains	have	stopped	since	the	1970:		 	Does	this	coincide	with	the	loss	of	homo	ludens?	In	Johan	Huizinga’s	
Homo	Ludens:	A	
Study	of	the	Play	
Element	in	Culture	(1938),	he	refers	to	a	long	tradition	of	thought	that	glimpses	through	in	Spinoza’s	remark	that	the	world	belongs	to	the	playing	child,	that	the	child	rules	the	universe	(Anchor,	1978:	63).	Before	we	can	inquire	into	the	relationship	between	technology,	management,	and	play/creativity,	we	need	to	elaborate	on	how	organizational	conduct	is	a	target	for	managerial	control.		
Management,	control,	government	Critical	or	genealogical	studies,	often	Foucault-based,	have	focused	on	management	as	a	technology	in	the	service	of	discipline	and	control	(e.g.	Burrell,	1988;	Barratt,	2008).	I	note	this	due	to	the	rich	nature	of	this	literature,	from	which	I	have	also	drawn	a	lot	of	inspiration	and	indeed	conceptual	direction	(Miller	and	Rose,	1990;	Gordon,	Miller	and	Burchell,	1991;	Dean,	1999).	Admittedly,	using	technology	mainly	to	increase	efficiency	(Simon,	1945:	182-4)	also	makes	management	more	into	a	technology,	and	so	the	two	sides	are	not	possible	to	isolate.	I	have	also	meant	to	point	out	above	that	only	an	already	‘digital’	management	(since	Taylor),	breaking	down	work	into	constitutive	parts	(cf.	Ingersoll	and	Adams,	1986,	above)	eagerly	picks	up	digitalisation	as	a	means	to	further	its	immanent	goals	–	control	and	efficiency.		
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If	management	can	be	understood	as	a	technology	in	itself	there	would	of	course	be	a	sense	in	which	F.W.	Taylor’s	basis	in	engineering	still	defines	what	management	is.	The	instrumentality	of	technology	is	here	understood	as	that	“…it	serves	the	end	of	another,	only	to	the	degree	that	it	realizes	its	own	end.”	(Agamben,	2015:	70).	I	have	sought	to	approach	the	role	of	today’s	information	processing	support	systems	–	such	as	Enterprise	Resource	Planning	(ERP)	software	in	particular	–	genealogically,	to	inquire	into	whether,	as	technology,	management	reduces	organising	to	technē	and	squeezes	poiesis	out	in	its	instrumental	focus	on	its	own	end.	In	the	‘hands	of	management’	(management	itself	being	an	instrumental	hand	–	manus,	Latin	for	hand)	such	software	also	grasps	the	hand	that	holds	it	in	the	sense	that	it	serves	management	to	the	degree	that	it	realises	its	own	end:	algorithmically	controlled	organisation	(cf.	Beverungen,	2015).	Management	is	now	totally	dependent	on	information-processing	software.	When	the	‘raw	material’	used	by	various	management	control	software	is	information	about	human	behaviour,	the	user	of	such	software	becomes	raw	material	for	it	in	the	use.	Yet,	it	is	in	using	it	that	this	disposition	of	the	software	–	to	control	by	processing	information	–	is	realised:	“Thus	an	instrument	has	two	operations,	one	which	belongs	to	it	according	to	its	own	form,	and	another	which	belongs	to	it	insofar	as	it	is	moved	by	the	principal	agent	and	which	rises	above	the	ability	of	its	own	form.”	(Acquinas	3,	q.	27,	art.	4,	in	Agamben,	2015:	73).	‘According	to	its	own	form’	would	refer	to	the	algorithmic	mathematics	on	the	basis	of	which	the	software	operates	in	a	certain	way,	and	the	‘rise	above’	would	then	correspond	to	the	managerial	control	that	is	achieved	by	making	use	of	the	software	in	a	certain	way.	However,	when	you	push	the	control	buttons,	you	are	already	in	the	system	and	obey	predetermined	or	pre-programmed	responses.	This	is	an	important	part	of	the	softwarisation	of	the	organisation	(Beverungen,	2015).	Human	Resource	Development	software	has	since	long	re-defined	the	person	as	a	piece	of	‘human	capital.’	Enterprise	Resource	Planning	software	packages	(e.g.	such	that	SAP	sell)	need	the	HR-component	to	be	fitting	the	rest	of	the	software	system	in	order	to	fulfil	its	promises	(greater	control,	making	more	
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with	less,	decision-making	basis	composed	by	ever	more	information,	processed	in	ever	more	sophisticated	ways).	In	this	paper	I	have	nurtured	the	possibility	to	look	the	other	way,	where	–	in	the	extreme	case	-	the	non-functional,	inoperable	human	that	has	exhausted	all	digital	capacity	and	only	has	analogue	greyness	and	potential	left,	stands	‘naked’	and	asks	us	how	to	‘enter	the	organised	life’?	If	we,	rather	than	focus	on	the	digital/instrumental	as	a	development	in	itself,	ask	the	Agamben-inspired	question	of	whether	bare	life	still	resides	somewhere	in	organisations	today	and,	if	so,	where	and	how?	The	point	behind	asking	would	be	the	suspicion	that	it	is	from	such	life	that	creation	springs	(Smith,	2007;	Massumi,	2011;	Deleuze,	1996;	Colebrook	and	Maxwell,	2016).		Bare	life,	where	freedom	and	subjection	rub	shoulders	(Agamben,	1995:	13)	is	of	course	also	where	technology’s	promise	makes	the	strongest	impact	on	the	human.	Simon	again,	in	1945:	“We	are	laying	the	foundations	for	a	science	of	information	processing	that	we	can	expect	will	greatly	increase	our	effectiveness	in	handling	the	information	around	us.”	(P.	285).	Information	systems	that	more	effectively	and	efficiently	will	help	us	handle	information.	We	are	increasingly	wanted	as	cybernetic	organisms	that	can	integrate	and	interact	with	cybernetic	systems.	In	such	systems,	the	bare	human	becomes	a	bug,	a	glitch,	a	cost.		
Technology,	play	and	creativity	The	image	of	the	playing	child	that	we	glimpsed	in	Spinoza’s	note	above	is	of	course	not	his	but	Heraclitus’,	one	of	the	pre-Socratic	philosophers	that	is	often	referred	to	as	the	inaugurator	of	process	philosophical	thinking	that	has	followed	upon	a	poststructuralist	questioning	of	Being,	structure,	and	self-grounded	subjectivity.	Heraclitus	talks	about	the	child	as	moving	freely,	and	Deleuze	(a	contemporary	process	philosophers)	re-uses	this	in	his	Bergson-based	(Deleuze,	1988)	description	of	creativity,	where	the	invention	of	a	new	language	within	language	(Proust’s	idea	describing	what	writers	do	when	they	create)	brings	thought	into	thinking	as	a	free	movement.	This	sets	action	free,	free	in	the	sense	that	there	is	no	template	to	follow;	action	is	not	limited	by	an	awareness	of	an	efficient	way	of	doing	it,	a	norm	for	how	to	act	properly.	It	has	not	seen	the	image	of	the	pincers,	nor	been	contaminated	by	the	metanarrative	
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of	economy	as	a	reality	that	limits	practice.	It	moves	freely	in	the	space	for	play	that	imagination	has	led	the	body	to	assume	is	available,	bringing	action	to	the	virtual	fringe	of	things	(Massumi,	2002;	Hjorth,	2014).	Here	the	analogue	cannot	but	tend	towards	its	immanent	processual	nextness,	imagining	and	anticipating	the	becoming-more	of	the	world.	It	leaps	from	potential	to	actual,	gives	in	to	incipient	nextness	rolling	into	the	world’s	becoming-already-more.		Play,	however,	must	also	be	understood	as	how	we	learn	to	relate	to	this	new	‘level	of	intervention’	called	economy	(in	its	modern	sense).	We	play	our	way	to	learn	about	the	economy	of	social	life.	Play	maintains	this	capacity	in	some	form.	In	Agamben’s	conceptualization	of	governmentality,	which	critiques	Foucault’s	(Leshem,	2015),	there	would	be	bareness	in	play.	Playing	would	be	a	mode	characterized	by	potentiality	and	possibilities	of	becoming.	In	our	adult	lives	–	when	we	unlearn	our	capacity	to	be	children	–	playing	postpones	the	‘mature’	ways	of	behaving.	Play	creates	illusion	(inlusio,	inludere,	in-play)	and	the	“…fun	of	playing	resists	all	analysis,	all	logical	interpretation.”	(Huizinga,	1955:	3).	Playing	can	be	related	to	Agamben’s	concept	of	the	inoperable	life,	life	that	is	saturated	by	potential,	but	which	defies	the	templates	for	action	available.	This	is	when	life	can	‘donate’	itself	over	to	knowledge	(Robert,	2013;	Hjorth	and	Painter-Morland,	2016)	again,	as	a	bare	start.		The	new	seriousness	of	industrial	production,	the	technologically	super-charged	rationality	of	management,	had	no	room	for	ludere,	play,	and	homo	oeconomicus	instead	rose	to	reign	in	the	modern	organization.	But	maybe	it	is	precisely	for	the	reason	that	it	was	‘lost’,	that	it	now	is	something	we	desperately	need	to	find.	The	call	upon	the	creative,	entrepreneurial	employee,	the	one	that	needs	to	co-create	the	innovative	organization,	is	perhaps	also	a	cry	reflecting	a	sense	of	that	something	is	about	to	get	washed	out	for	good?	Underneath	all	talk	about	creativity,	all	ideas	about	innovation	management	(Van	de	Ven,	1999)	and	managing	creative	(Amabile,	1998)	or	managing	for	creativity	(Florida	and	Goodnight,	2005),	is	perhaps	a	sense	of	loss.	Where	art	thou,	homo	ludens?	Has	technology	come	in	the	way	for	play?			The	above-mentioned	article	from	The	Economist	(Sept.	2015)	also	
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included	a	subtle	reference	to	Hirschman’s	study	(without	mentioning	it)	via	an	illustration,	where	again	a	slightly	more	modern	set	of	pincers	grasp	the	heart.	In	this	version,	although	seemingly	operated	by	a	human,	there	is	an	indication	of	lost	control:		 (Illustration:	Brett	Ryder,	The	Economist,	Sept.	12th,	2015)		 Looking	for	the	place	of	the	human	in	organisations	is	by	no	means	new.	A	crucial	event	in	this	history	is	when	Elton	Mayo	convinced	Rockefeller	to	fund	his	research	that	in	turn	promised	to	solve	the	‘problem’	of	democracy	at	the	workplace.	As	O’Connor	(1999:	224)	points	out,	“Mayo	directed	his	attention	to	the	interior,	subjective,	emotional	state	of	the	human	being;	and	he	promoted	a	particular	point	of	view	about	human	nature	based	on	this	view.”	If	Taylor	mechanized	and	economized	time	by	moving	control	to	the	tempo	of	the	machine,	Mayo	would	be	the	one	that	opens	up	to	the	programmable	employee,	the	precondition	for	the	softwarisied	organization.	He	does	this	by	normalizing	the	managerial	interest	in	the	human	as	one	based	on	correcting	the	mind	of	the	employee	so	that	it	better	matches	–	i.e.,	processes	information	to	cybernetically	fit	the	system	–	and	can	start	to	perform	as	human	capital.	To	Mayo,	the	human	in	its	urge	to	take	part,	with	its	questioning	authority	was	all	raw-material	for	the	work	of	the	human	resource	manager:		“His	investigations	stressed	the	irrational,	nonlogical,	and	sentimental	aspect	of	the	human	being;	and,	consistent	with	his	key	sources,	they	also	emphasized	the	basic	deviance	and	maladjustment	of	the	human	being.	The	technique	to	correct	this	maladjustment	also	came	from	psychology:	what	Mayo	called	the	'counseling	interview'	(Roethlisberger	and	Dickson,	1939:	270-91),	now	a	standard	part	of	HRM	practices	(Whitsett	and	Yorks,	1983:	165-85).”	(O’Connor,	1999)		I	am	obviously	not	sharing	Mayo’s	interest	in	trying	to	figure	out	how	to	correct	this	irrational	behaviour	of	humans	in	organisations	(Mayo,	1923).	This	interest	
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in	conducting	the	conduct	of	the	employees	has	driven	management	as	a	form	of	governmentality	in	late	industrialism.	As	already	mentioned,	Mayo’s	agenda	is	important	as	a	step	in	the	preparation	for	the	algorithmic	organisation,	calling	upon	a	certain	management-employee	relationship	that	the	recent	digitalisation	of	information	systems	can	feed	with	decision-making	support	(Mayo,	1945).	Mayo	was	thus	as	central	for	managerial	governmentality	as	was	Taylor.	When	we	try	to	think	with	Agamben,	looking	for	the	bare	life	we	ask	where	the	analogue	(as	opposed	to	digital)	potentials	still	looms	in	organisations.	Admittedly,	there	is	a	de	Certeau	style	of	thinking	here.	Recall	how	his	belief	in	people	often	resulted	in	a	praise	of	everyday	creativity:			
“Every culture proliferates along its margins. Irruptions take place that are called 
‘creations’ in relation to stagnancies. Bubbling out of swamps and bogs, a thousand 
flashes at once scintillate and are extinguished all over the surface of a society. In the 
official imaginary, they are noted only as exceptions or marginal events. … In reality, 
creation is a disseminated proliferation. It swarms and throbs. A polymorphous 
carnival infiltrates everywhere, a celebration both in the streets and in the homes of 
those who are unblended by the aristocratic and museological model of durable 
production.” (de Certeau 1997, pp. 139-40)		 The	analogue	would	represent	pockets	of	transformative	force,	simply	because	of	their	ambiguous,	indecisive	quality,	their	irreducibility	to	either	zero	(0)	or	one	(1).	I	am	indeed	sharing	Mayo’s	Hobbesian-Galileian	view	that	motion	is	the	‘natural	state	of	bodies,’	(a	view	shared	by	Whitehead,	Bergson,	and	Deleuze)	but	have	related	this	as	more	acutely	and	centrally	expressed	in	Spinoza’s	philosophy.	In	Spinoza’s	philosophy	it	is	also	developed	into	a	thinking	with	more	immediate	implications	for	processual	organisation	studies	(Hjorth	and	Holt,	2014).	De	Certeau	is	with	us	also	here	as	we	tie	the	analogous	to	the	indecisive,	vague,	and	as	such	open	to	movement:	“This	nowhere	gives	a	tactic	mobility,	to	be	sure,	but	a	mobility	that	must	accept	the	chance	offerings	of	the	moment,	and	seize	on	the	wing	the	possibilities	that	offer	themselves	at	any	given	moment.	[…]	In	short,	a	tactic	is	an	art	of	the	weak.”	(1984:	37).	We	could	add;	it	is	an	art	of	the	vague.	Deleuze,	the	reader	of	Spinoza	that	manages	to	revitalize	and	renew	the	reception	of	his	ideas,	discusses	power	in	Spinoza	as	intimately	related	to	movement	and	affect:	“[A]	ll	power	is	inseparable	from	a	capacity	for	being	
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affected,	and	this	capacity	for	being	affected	is	constantly	and	necessarily	filled	by	affections	that	realize	it’	(1988:	97).	And	more	directly	to	the	point	of	the	centrality	of	movement	for	Spinoza’s	philosophy:	“And	since	the	affections	are	not	separable	from	movement	by	which	they	cause	us	to	go	to	a	greater	or	lesser	perfection	(joy	or	sadness)	[…]	consciousness	appears	as	the	continual	awareness	of	this	passage	from	greater	to	lesser,	or	from	lesser	to	greater,	as	a	witness	of	the	variations	and	determinations	of	the	conatus…”	(Deleuze,	1988:	21).	Conatus	has	clear	resonance	with	Nietzsche’s	will	to	power	(Spindler,	2009)	and	describes	our	power	to	be	affected	and	our	strive	to	persevere.		Mayo	digitalised	the	way	management	should	relate	to	humans	in	organisations:	the	human	is	represented	as	codeable	software.	He	transformed	Taylor’s	machinic	preparation	it	into	a	digital	technology	(symbolised	by	HRM)	that	promoted	certain	techniques	(e.g.	the	counselling	interview)	that	in	turn	made	up	a	new	human-at-work:	the	technologically	grasped/approached/called	upon	human.	This	grasp	is	now	made	by	a	algorithmic	hand,	an	intermediary	tool,	an	enterprise	operations	management	software	(of	some	kind)	that	shapes	what	it	grasps	as	well	as	the	one	that	grasps.	At	least	this	is	the	idea,	born	in	F.	W.	Taylor’s	inauguration	of	‘scientific	management’.	Mayo	clearly	declares	his	relationship	to	Taylor	as	being	characterised	as	continuation,	as	he	notes	that	his	work	is…:	“an	extension	of	that	begun	by	the	pioneer	[Taylor].”	(Mayo,	1924:	258,	quoted	by	O’Connor,	1999:	224).	This	made	the	governing	ambitions	of	managerialism	so	efficient	in	its	grasp.	However,	with	Agamben,	Deleuze,	Spinoza	and	de	Certeau,	we	note	that	our	strive	to	preserve	our	conatus,	would	drive	us	into	the	organisationally/managerially	grey/vague.	This	would	represent	an	escape	from	being	determined	and	grasped/governed	by	the	algorithmic	tools	of	present-day	organisation.	As	such,	it	would	increase	our	movement	towards	joy,	our	increased	capacity	to	create.	Not	produce,	but	create.	
	
Technology,	affect,	freedom	and	creativity	What	is	distinct	about	modern	technique	or	technology,	Ellul	says	(1954:	67),	is	that	it	is	instrumental	in	the	sense	that	it	seeks	to	eliminate	such	variability	that	was	found	in	how	each	person	tried	to	compensate	for	the	deficiency	of	the	tools	used.	In	such	compensation,	individual	skills,	professional	know-how,	and	a	
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trained	eye	were	needed.	This	varied	from	person	to	person,	thus	there	was	room	for	expression	and	style.	Expression	and	style	is	what	we	historically	have	associate	primarily	with	creativity	in	the	arts.	This,	however,	is	presently	emerging	as	a	strong	discourse	on	innovation	(e.g.	Austin	and	Devin,	2003),	i.e.,	that	art	and	science	has	to	mingle	for	there	to	be	innovation.	It	seems	that	expression	and	style,	what	we	associate	with	the	artistic,	is	an	important	condition	for	creativity	to	happen;	creativity	that	is	increasingly	collective	and	springs	from	ensemble	work	(O’Donnel	and	Devin,	2012).	The	algorithmic	organisation	idealises	homogeneity	in	form	so	as	to	limit	variation	of	expression.	The	model	has	to	lend	itself	to	be	replicated,	ease	of	administration	and	fit	with	standards	of	production.	‘Making	do’,	according	to	experience,	tacit	knowledge,	style	and	expression,	is	not	included	as	a	playful	use	of	the	‘grey/vague’.	For	sure,	creativity	has	never	been	limited	to	the	arts	(de	Certeau,	1984),	but	always	been	part	of	human	culture	wherever	this	is	found	(de	Certeau,	1997;	Huizinga,	1938).	Today,	as	a	means	to	handle	the	hangover	of	industrialisation,	the	mature	industrialised	economies	all	stress	the	need	for	innovation	and	entrepreneurship.	Listening	to	this	discourse,	we	sense	a	return	of	expression,	style,	and	imagination,	what	is	called	for	as	an	increase	of	variation	needed	for	a	multiplication	of	differences,	as	a	source	of	newness,	to	happen.	In	line	with	this	Walter	Isaacson,	President	and	CEO	of	Aspen	Institute,	and	author	of	the	Steve	Jobs	biography	(2013),	notes:	“The	most	creative	innovations	of	the	digital	age	came	from	those	who	were	able	to	connect	the	arts	and	sciences.”	(weforum.org,	2014).		Technology	(as	the	ideas	for	a	technique)	are	not	prostheses	of	the	body,	Massumi	(2011:	147)	writes,	“[T]he	senses	are	already	that.	Technologies	are	abstract-event	multipliers	and	disseminators.	They	are	prostheses	of	the	life	of	abstraction.	Aliveness	engines.”	(2011:	147).	By	the	abstract,	Massumi	here	means	what	the	process	philosophers	mean	when	they	talk	about	the	virtual.	The	virtual	is	potentiality	that	could	become	concrete	according	to	the	local	conditions	and	the	immanent	tendency	of	a	process.	A	process	moves	to	the	limit	of	what	it	can	do	given	the	intensity,	‘the	immanent	affirmation’	(Ibid,	p.	84)	of	the	process.	At	this	limit	it	faces	newness.	In	experience	we	find	the	genesis	of	
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things,	Massumi	further	elaborates	(2011:	15),	meaning	the	potentials	for	change	is	still	there,	played	out	in	the	occasion	where	we	find	ourselves.	The	virtual	is	an	abstract	event	potential,	the	potential	becoming	concrete	of,	say,	an	idea.	Technologies	boost	such	tendency	to	become	through	continued	variation.	Technologies	are	not	the	medium,	rather	the	interval,	the	moveability	of	the	change	(Massumi,	2002).	In	this	sense,	technologies	are	not	prostheses	added	onto	the	body,	but	rather	part	of	the	body,	like	the	senses,	and	qualitatively	transforming	its	capacities	and	becomings.	With	technologies,	thus,	it	is	always	a	question	of	‘what	a	body	can	do’	(Spinoza’s	question).	Technologies	are	thus	also	a	medium	for	opening	up	and	increase	our	capacity	–	the	route	to	Spinozian	joy.		“The	body	cannot	determine	the	mind	to	think,	nor	can	the	mind	determine	the	body	to	motion	or	rest,	or	to	anything	else	(if	there	is	anything	else;	Spinoza).”	(The	Ethics,	Part	3,	Prop.	2)		This	is	Spinoza’s	parallelism,	the	mind	and	body	is	one	and	the	same,	there	is	one	mode,	which	is	now	conceived	under	the	attribute	of	thought,	now	under	the	attribute	of	extension.	Technology	would	then	always	be	part	of	the	mind	and	body	and	enlarge	or	extend	both	in	parallel.	Spinoza	can	be	used	to	inquire	into	what	role	technology	has	for	management,	with	a	specific	focus	on	the	tension	(inspired	by	the	so-far	cursory	analysis	of	the	‘Affectus	Comprime’-image	above,	and	the	quote	from	Spinoza	on	lens-making)	between	the	free,	playful	(admittedly	almost	always	romanticised)	hand	guided	by	experience-based	wisdom,	and	the	technologically	directed	template-delimited,	predictable,	efficiency	enhancing	hand	of	management.	Maybe	this	can	lead	us	to	disclose	a	problem	in	today’s	organisations	when	there	is	a	simultaneous	emphasis	on	collective	creativity	and	technology-powered	knowledge-creation	and	communication.	What	does	it	mean	when	organisation	(as	practice	and	process)	is	in	the	technological	grip	of	the	instrumental	hand	(manus)	of	management	(for	which	predictability	and	efficiency	are	the	most	important	considerations)	and	organisation	itself	therefore	grasps	technology	as	a	means	to	increase	predictability	and	efficiency?	Where	does	the	free	hand	go?	Or,	technology	has	precisely	set	the	hand	free	from	the	governing	constraints	of	management?	Technology	has	bent	open	management’s	grasp	and	made	movement	possible?	
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Technology	has	democratised	organisations,	increase	our	capacity	for	play,	or	increased	control	and	tightened	the	managerial	grip?		
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